Klyachko and coworkers consider an orthogonality graph in the form of a pentagram, and in this way derive a Kochen-Specker inequality for spin 1 systems. In some low-dimensional situations Hilbert spaces are naturally organised, by a magical choice of basis, into SO(N) orbits. Combining these ideas some very elegant results emerge. We give a careful discussion of the pentagram operator, and then show how the pentagram underlies a number of other quantum “paradoxes”, such as that of Hardy.

The book series Linguistische Arbeiten (LA) publishes high-quality work in linguistics that addresses current issues in synchrony and diachrony, theoretically or empirically oriented.

Dealing with conflicts seems to be a great challenge in society today. But not only in society. Higher education displays an air of resoluteness with certainty and security that disguises the conflicts and the fear of conflicts in a substantial number of subjects. If not in a state of denial, higher education avoids taking up conflicts over issues, for learning. The detailed investigation of Tagore’s pedagogical writings, with a focus on the importance of conflicts in education, reveals a genuine embrace (...) of conflicts for education. Conflicts are natural and necessary for the development and change of both the individual and society and the start of a ‘creative imagination’ to solve the problems we face in life. Contradictions in conflicts are not incompatible incongruities that are irreconcilable and mutually exclusive, but to the contrary, in need of each other. Contradictions do not represent different worlds but are substantial parts of one world: together they form a unity. Conflicting forces are necessary to create harmony. Creativity, imagination, love, art, and critical encounters are key elements in Tagore’s practical education aimed at finding similarities among people instead of emphasizing differences. Relations between people over the Identity of people. In other words, we need conflicts to become creative and imaginative human beings. The paper continues discussing conceptual and practical issues that seem necessary to get the teaching of conflicts in education off the ground. On the conceptual level, in particular our dealing with uncertainty and fear, the valuation of conflict and the need for uncertainty-researching education. On a practical level, I propose a certain teaching model, a supportive curriculum, a way of choosing genuine conflicts for education and finally, I argue for specific support and education of teachers, acknowledging the vital role teachers play in delivering the education that we need. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is twofold: The general aim is to shed light on the structure of species discoveries new to biology by bringing together a practice-oriented philosophy of science perspective with a philosophy of language perspective. The more specific aim is to argue that and to show how the overall structure of biological species discoveries comprises aspects of both institutional and non-institutional reality. The author proceeds as follows: he shows that placing the focus on the topic of scientific (...) discoveries enables us to circumvent two long-standing problems. He analyzes three fictional cases of discoveries in order to bring about a greater sensitivity for the concept of discovery. He takes a closer look at a real example – the discovery of a deep-sea anglerfish – and identifies the main structural features of species discovery processes in biology. In order to connect these results with Searle’s account of institutional reality, he provides an overview of the conceptual apparatus needed here. In bringing Searle’s account together with the structural features of species discoveries developed before, he shows to what extent declarative speech acts play a central role in species discovery processes in biology. (shrink)

Jan G. Michel argues that we need a philosophy of scientific discovery. Before turning to the question of what such a philosophy might look like, he addresses two questions: Don’t we have a philosophy of scientific discovery yet? And do we need one at all? To answer the first question, he takes a closer look at history and finds that we have not had a systematic philosophy of scientific discovery worthy of the name for over 150 years. To answer the (...) second question, Michel puts forward three arguments that show the importance of a philosophy of scientific discovery. Briefly, he arrives at the following answers: No, we don’t yet have a philosophy of scientific discovery, and yes, we definitely need one. To remedy this shortcoming, Michel analyzes the concept of discovery, leading him to the insight that scientific discoveries have an underlying structure with certain structural features. Some of these features may be important but not indispensable to scientific discovery processes; these include eureka moments, serendipities, joint discoveries, special science funding, and others. In addition, Michel identifies three indispensable structural features which he examines in detail and which he places in a picture with a certain dynamics according to which the process of making scientific discoveries can be seen as a path, leading us from finding and acceptance to knowledge. (shrink)

We discuss anatomical data that may represent the substrate for very diverse input to a single folium, indirectly supporting the notion of a laterolateral beam spreading along the long axis of a folium. We also raise the question of whether the more linear body representation in somatosensory cortico-ponto-cerebellar pathways represent an adaptation to sequential processing of information from contiguous body parts.

The focus of this article is a question that has been neglected in debates about digitalization: Could machines replace human scientists? To provide an intelligible answer to it, we need to answer a further question: What is it that makes (or constitutes) a scientist? I offer an answer to this question by proposing a new demarcation criterion for science which I call “the discoverability criterion”. I proceed as follows: (1) I explain why the target question of this article is important, (...) and (2) show that it leads to a variant of the demarcation problem of science. (3) By arguing that it is probably an essential feature of science that we can make scientific discoveries, I suggest a novel way of dealing with this problem by proposing a new demarcation criterion. Before introducing it, (4) I analyze an exemplary case of a real scientific discovery, and (5) argue that scientific discovery processes have a general underlying structure. (6) I introduce my discoverability criterion for science and present my master argument that helps us understand which criteria have to be fulfilled in order to decide whether machines can replace human scientists or not. (7) I conclude by answering the article’s target question and bringing forward a take-home message. (shrink)

To investigate whether making performance predictions affects prospective memory processing, we asked one group of participants to predict their performance in a PM task embedded in an ongoing task and compared their performance with a control group that made no predictions. A third group gave not only PM predictions but also ongoing-task predictions. Exclusive PM predictions resulted in slower ongoing-task responding both in a nonfocal and in a focal PM task. Only in the nonfocal task was the additional slowing accompanied (...) by improved PM performance. Even in the nonfocal task, however, was the correlation between ongoing-task speed and PM performance reduced after predictions, suggesting that the slowing was not completely functional for PM. Prediction-induced changes could be avoided by asking participants to additionally predict their performance in the ongoing task. In sum, the present findings substantiate a role of metamemory for attention-allocation strategies of PM. (shrink)

Jan G. Michel klärt in seinem Artikel "Vom Transhumanismus zur These des erweiterten Geistes: Ethische Implikationen?" zunächst eine eindeutige These des Transhumanismus, den er als die Position versteht, dass menschliche Personen ihre gegenwärtigen physischen und mentalen Limitationen durch die von den Wissenschaften zur Verfügung gestellten Technologien erweitern können. Im Anschluss daran wendet er sich der in der Philosophie des Geistes und der Kognitionswissenschaft diskutierten sogenannten These des erweiterten Geistes zu und argumentiert, dass entgegen des ersten Eindrucks der für diese Debatte (...) zentrale Begriff nicht derjenige des menschlichen Geistes, sondern der Begriff der Kognition ist, die sich aus Sicht Michels durch externe, technologische Hilfsmittel erweitern lässt, ohne dass dadurch gravierende ethische Implikationen für den Personenstatus impliziert werden. Michel endet mit einer Analyse des für den Transhumanismus oft als zentral angenommenen Begriffs der erweiterten Person und fragt kritisch nach dem semantischen Gehalt dieses Begriffs. (shrink)

John Searle zählt zweifellos zu den weltweit wichtigsten und einflussreichsten Denkern der Gegenwart. Seine grundlegenden und nachhaltigen Beiträge zur Sprachphilosophie, zur Philosophie des Geistes, zur Handlungstheorie und zur Sozialphilosophie werden weit über die Grenzen des Fachs Philosophie hinaus wahrgenommen und gehören vielfach zum Standardrepertoire wissenschaftlicher Forschung und Lehre. -/- Michael Kober und Jan G. Michel bieten in diesem Buch eine übersichtliche sowie gut verständliche, aber auch kritische Einführung in das Gesamtwerk John Searles: Neben einer sehr persönlichen biographischen Notiz und einem (...) kurzen Überblick über seine Leitfragen und Positionen wird jeder der genannten Arbeitsbereiche John Searles in seinen wesentlichen Grundzügen historisch wie systematisch eingeordnet, dargestellt und diskutiert. Indem Kober und Michel dabei nicht chronologisch, sondern inhaltlich systematisch vorgehen, treten außerdem die Zusammenhänge innerhalb des Gesamtwerks John Searles deutlich hervor, so dass dieses schließlich im Lichte der heutigen Philosophie bewertet werden kann. (shrink)

In this paper, I mainly pursue the following two goals: on the one hand, I want to show how a central Fregean insight is tried to be captured within a two-dimensional strategy. On the other hand, I want to show that, in the light of Saul Kripke’s arguments against descriptivism, this strategy is faced with a fundamental problem. I proceed in four steps: in a first step, I bring together the passages that contain a central Fregean insight as a source (...) of inspiration for a two-dimensional reconstruction and that suggest a descriptivist reading of Frege’s view. In a second step, I shortly present Kripke’s threefold argumentation against two versions of descriptivism, which is also the basis for Kripke’s view that proper names are rigid designators. In a third step, I explain the basic idea of a Frege-inspired two-dimensional strategy which is used to reconcile theories of definite descriptions with theories of rigid designation and which is sometimes characterized as ‘neo-descriptivism’. Since the two-dimensional strategy is dependent on rigidified definite descriptions, I argue, in a fourth step, that, in the light of Kripke’s epistemological and semantic arguments, the two-dimensional strategy is problematic and untenable – though it is, nevertheless, motivated by Kripke’s modal argument. (shrink)

Zu den großen Rätseln der Philosophie des Geistes, ja der Philosophie überhaupt, gehört die folgende Frage: Wie lässt sich der qualitative oder phänomenale Charakter bewusster Erlebnisse beschreiben, erklären oder verstehen? Wie lässt sich beispielsweise erklären, wie es ist, eine Rose zu riechen? Einerseits erscheint angesichts der Erfolgsgeschichte der modernen Naturwissenschaften die Annahme plausibel, dass sich letztlich alles physikalisch erklären lässt, auch bewusste Erlebnisse. Bei dieser Annahme handelt es sich um die physikalistische Intuition, die in der analytischen Philosophie des Geistes die (...) Hauptmotivation der gegenwärtig dominierenden Position darstellt: der Position des Physikalismus. Andererseits stellt der nur subjektiv erfassbare qualitative Charakter bewusster Erlebnisse das Kernproblem für eine physikalische Erklärung des Bewusstseins dar: Wie sollte das Erlebnis von Rosenduft physikalisch erklärbar sein? Dabei handelt es sich um die antiphysikalistische Intuition, auf deren Grundlage in den letzten Jahren verschiedene Argumente gegen den Physikalismus vorgebracht worden sind. Indem in der vorliegenden Studie diesen beiden, zumindest auf den ersten Blick unvereinbar erscheinenden Intuitionen ausführlich und vorbehaltlos Rechnung getragen wird – sie stellen sowohl den Ausgangspunkt als auch den argumentativen Rahmen der Studie dar –, wird untersucht, wie sich der qualitative Charakter bewusster Erlebnisse im Rahmen einer Theorie des Bewusstseins fassen lässt. (shrink)

Im Jahre 1998 verblüfften Andy Clark und David Chalmers die philosophische Gemeinschaft mit der so genannten These des erweiterten Geistes, die im Kern besagt, dass kognitive Systeme nicht-biologische Komponenten enthalten können und sich damit über die Grenzen biologischer Organismen hinaus erstrecken können. Die These wird seitdem nicht nur von Philosophen, sondern auch von Kognitions- und Neurowissenschaftlern intensiv und kontrovers diskutiert. In den Beiträgen, die in dem vorliegenden ersten deutschsprachigen Band zur These des erweiterten Geistes versammelt sind, werden u.a. die folgenden (...) Fragen behandelt: Was soll es heißen, dass der Geist nicht (nur) im Kopf ist? In welchem Sinne könnte er erweitert sein, und welche Möglichkeiten der Erweiterung gibt es? Welche Zusammenhänge bestehen zwischen Geist und Kognition sowie zwischen Kopplung und Konstitution? Was genau besagt der von Clark und Chalmers vorgebrachte aktive Externalismus? Welche Bedeutung hat die These des erweiterten Geistes für repräsentationalistische und für funktionalistische Theorien des Geistes sowie für Theorien kollektiver Intentionalität und sozialer Kognition? Welche Anwendungen der These könnte es geben? (shrink)

John R. Searle is one of the world's leading philosophers. During his long and outstanding career, he has made groundbreaking and lasting contributions to the philosophy of language, to the philosophy of mind, as well as to the nature, structure, and functioning of social reality. This volume documents the 13th Münster Lectures on Philosophy with John R. Searle. It includes not only 11 critical papers on Searle's philosophy and Searle's replies to the papers, but also an original article by John (...) R. Searle on his overall philosophical enterprise entitled "The Basic Reality and the Human Reality". -/- "I think Münster is probably unique among contemporary universities in its ability to produce such a high level of philosophical production from their philosophy students." - John R. Searle. (shrink)

Scientific progress depends crucially on scientific discoveries. Yet the topic of scientific discoveries has not been central to debate in the philosophy of science. This book aims to remedy this shortcoming. Based on a broad reading of the term “science” (similar to the German term “Wissenschaft”), the book convenes experts from different disciplines who reflect upon several intertwined questions connected to the topic of making scientific discoveries. -/- Among these questions are the following: What are the preconditions for making scientific (...) discoveries? What is it that we (have to) do when we make discoveries in science? What are the objects of scientific discoveries, how do we name them, and how do scientific names function? Do discoveries in, say, physics and biology, share an underlying structure, or do they differ from each other in crucial ways? Are other fields such as theology and environmental studies loci of scientific discovery? What is the purpose of making scientific discoveries? Explaining nature or reality? Increasing scientific knowledge? Finding new truths? If so, how can we account for instructive blunders and serendipities in science? -/- In the light of the above, the following is an encompassing question of the book: What does it mean to make a discovery in science, and how can scientific discoveries be distinguished from non-scientific discoveries? (shrink)

Im Zentrum des vorliegenden Sammelbandes steht die Frage nach dem Bösen in Religionen, die als monotheistisch verstanden werden oder für die zumindest die Herrschaft des Hauptgottes über alle anderen Götter und Mächte ein entscheidendes Anliegen ist. Der Schwerpunkt liegt auf dem sich formierenden Judentum und Christentum sowie dem Alten Testament. Besonderes Interesse gilt den Texten aus Qumran, und darüber hinaus erfolgt ein Blick auf mittelalterliche Heiligenlegenden. Die Beiträge des Bandes zeigen, dass es in den antiken jüdischen und christlichen Texte eine (...) große Vielfalt von Verkörperungen des Bösen gibt, sei es extern als Dämon oder Teufel, sei es intern als die menschliche Fähigkeit, Böses zu tun. Außerdem stellt sich heraus, dass in der jüdisch-christlichen Literatur Dualismus nicht grundsätzlich abgelehnt wird, aber nur Formen von Dualismus vorkommen, in denen das Böse Gott und dem Guten letztlich untergeordnet ist. Mit Beiträgen von: Jörn Bockmann, Miryam T. Brand, Jan Dochhorn, Matthew Goff, Erkki Koskenniemi, Michael Morris, Hector M. Patmore, Susanne Rudnig-Zelt, Markus Saur, Ryan E. Stokes, Oda Wischmeyer, Benjamin Wold. (shrink)

The Right of Nonuse provides a fresh and remarkably different perspective on the real causes of the ills plaguing the world's resources and environment. It re-examines the very nature of nature, and from this new perspective, argues that what is needed is for humans to grant to natural resources a legal right to be left alone - a right of nonuse. In the process, it explores the following questions: Why do natural resources continue to be depleted and removed at an (...) alarming rate? Why are species becoming extinct at a pace that may be unprecedented? Why does the environment continue to be polluted? Why do the weather and climate seem to be changing? Perhaps most important, why have laws, legal institutions and governments been unable to address and correct these problems? Jan Laitos reviews the history of our relationship with the natural environment and develops new ways of thinking about nature and its protection. Instead of proceeding with human-based goals, Laitos argues that we should protect environmental resources for their own intrinsic value. Instead of giving humans more and more rights to clean up the environment, and to halt resources depletion, a right of nonuse held by the resource itself should be created. Natural resources have always possessed this parallel nonuse function, and society should recognize and legitimize it. (shrink)

He also protected higher causes from responsibility by saying that evil may result from a combination of goods. Proclus objects: evil is real, and not the mere privation of form. Rather, it is a parasite feeding off good. Parasites have no proper cause, and higher beings are thus vindicated as being the causes only of the good off which evil feeds."--BOOK JACKET.

Bei der Suche nach dem Geist handelt es sich seit Jahrhunderten um ein zentrales Unterfangen in der Philosophie, das u.a. durch die folgenden Fragen charakterisiert ist: Was sind Merkmale des Geistes? Welche Arten geistiger Zustände lassen sich unterscheiden? Ist eine naturwissenschaftliche oder physikalische Erklärung des Geistes möglich? Lässt sich das Geistige auf das Physikalische reduzieren? Ist das Physikalische kausal abgeschlossen? Was heißt es eigentlich, dass etwas physikalisch ist? Wie kann der Geist Handlungen bewirken? Können wir denn so handeln, wie wir (...) wollen? Ist unser Wille frei? Welche Rolle spielen neurowissenschaftliche Ergebnisse für die Entwicklung einer guten Theorie des Geistes? Und welche Rolle spielen philosophische Gedankenexperimente? Was macht überhaupt eine gute Theorie des Geistes aus? Dieser Band, der auch an Einsteiger gerichtet ist, versammelt Beiträge zur Suche nach dem Geist von Andreas Hüttemann, Holger Lyre, Jan G. Michel, Gernot Münster, Martine Nida-Rümelin, Achim Stephan und Henrik Walter. (shrink)

In this contribution, I deal firstly with the problem of whether ‘religion’ can actually be defined. My answer is twofold. Firstly, that such a definition must indeed be deemed to be extremely un-like¬ly, if not downright impossible. Secondly, however, that definition also has more modest uses which may turn definitions of religion, that have shed this universalist ambition, into quite useful tools in the academic study of religions. In the second section, I shall address the question of why, if a (...) definition of religion turned out to be merely a useful research tool, one should bother to define ‘religion’ at all. My answer will be that one may indeed well dispense with it, but that, despite its very modest usefulness, it would still be unwise to do so. In my third section, I shall discuss these modest uses of definitions of religion, as well as their strategic implications. In the fourth and last section, I shall discuss the operational, or instrumental, definition of ‘religion’ which I have developed for my particular line of studies as an illustration of the pur¬poses which a definition of religion may serve in the academic study of religions. (shrink)

Argumentation as the public exchange of reasons is widely thought to enhance deliberative interactions that generate and justify reasonable public policies. Adopting an argumentation-theoretic perspective, we survey the norms that should govern public argumentation and address some of the complexities that scholarly treatments have identified. Our focus is on norms associated with the ideals of correctness and participation as sources of a politically legitimate deliberative outcome. In principle, both ideals are mutually coherent. If the information needed for a correct deliberative (...) outcome is distributed among agents, then maximising participation increases information diversity. But both ideals can also be in tension. If participants lack competence or are prone to biases, a correct deliberative outcome requires limiting participation. The central question for public argumentation, therefore, is how to strike a balance between both ideals. Rather than advocating a preferred normative framework, our main purpose is to illustrate the complexity of this theme. (shrink)

This essay addresses the question whether artificial speakers can perform speech acts in the technical sense of that term common in the philosophy of language. We here argue that under certain conditions artificial speakers can perform speech acts so understood. After explaining some of the issues at stake in these questions, we elucidate a relatively uncontroversial way in which machines can communicate, namely through what we call verbal signaling. But verbal signaling is not sufficient for the performance of a speech (...) act. To explain the difference, we elucidate the notion of a speech act developed by Austin in the mid-twentieth century and then discuss Strawson’s influential proposal for how that notion may be related to Grice’s conception of speaker meaning. We then refine Strawson’s synthesis in light of Armstrong’s reconceptualization of speaker meaning in terms of objectives rather than intentions. We next extend this conception of speech acts to the cases of recorded, proxy, and conditional speech acts. On this basis, we propose that a characteristic role for artificial speakers is as proxies in the performance of speech acts on behalf of their human creators. We also consider two objections to our position, and compare our approach with others: while other authors appeal to notions such as “quasi-assertion,” we offer a sharp characterization of what artificial speakers can do that does not impute intentions or similarly controversial powers to them. We conclude by raising doubts that our strategy can be applied to speech acts generally. (shrink)

People differ in their personal commitment to fighting climate change and protecting the environment. The question is, can we validly measure people’s commitment by what they say and what they claim they do in opinion polls? In our research, we demonstrate that opinions and reports of past behavior can be aggregated into comparable depictions of people’s personal commitment to fighting climate change and protecting the environment. In contrast to the commonly used operational scaling approaches, we ground our measure of people’s (...) environmental attitudes in a mathematically formalized psychological theory of the response process—the Campbell paradigm. This theory of the response process has already been extensively validated, and its relevance for manifest behavior has repeatedly been shown as well. In our secondary analysis of Eurobarometer data from 28 European countries, we apply the Campbell paradigm to a set of indicators that was not originally collected to be aggregated into a single scale. With our research, we propose a distinct way to measure behavior-relevant environmental attitudes that can be used even with a set of indicators that was originally atheoretically compiled. Overall, our study suggests that the Campbell paradigm provides a sound psychological measurement theory that can be applied to cross-cultural comparisons in the environmental protection domain. (shrink)

Die Debatten zu den Themen Physikalismus, Willensfreiheit und Künstliche Intelligenz stehen seit einigen Jahren im Mittelpunkt der Philosophie des Geistes. In den Debatten um den Physikalismus geht es dabei u.a. um folgende Fragen: Lässt sich alles, was es gibt, physikalisch erklären - auch der menschliche Geist? Lässt sich alles auf das Physische reduzieren? Ist der Bereich des Physischen kausal geschlossen? Realisiert das Physische das Mentale? Wie lässt sich mentale Verursachung erklären? In den Debatten um Willensfreiheit fragt man sich: Sind wir (...) physikalisch determiniert? Können wir freie Entscheidungen treffen? Sind wir für unsere Handlungen verantwortlich? Wie verhalten sich Freiheit und Determinismus zueinander? Welchen Beitrag kann die empirische Forschung leisten? In den Debatten um Künstliche Intelligenz werden diese Fragen verhandelt: Können Maschinen denken? Unterscheiden sich Menschen von Maschinen? Sind uns Computer geistig überlegen? Stellt maschinelle Intelligenz ein Modell für menschliche Kognition dar? Welchen wissenschaftlichen Nutzen kann Künstliche Intelligenz haben? Zu jedem der drei Themen Physikalismus, Willensfreiheit und Künstliche Intelligenz bietet das Buch drei Originalbeiträge von renommierten Wissenschaftlern verschiedener Disziplinen sowie jeweils einen kritischen Kommentar. Auf diese Weise soll deutlich werden, dass die drei Themen nicht nur eng miteinander zusammenhängen, sondern auch interdisziplinär von großem Interesse sind. (shrink)